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 Hands on the Wheel: 
A Call for Greater Regulation of Semi-Autonomous Cars* 
 TRACY HRESKO PEARL†  
To the insider they exhibited only their attractive features; to the out-
sider, only their repulsive ones. To nearly everyone but the occupants 
they were an inconvenience; to many a nuisance, and to some a veritable 
terror.1  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a scene in the 1980 hit comedy film Airplane! that seems to predict the 
future. After the pilot of the eponymous airplane collapses in the cockpit and has to 
be dragged from his seat, he sputters to the flight attendant that she should turn on 
the “automatic pilot.” She searches the control panel frantically and finds the right 
switch. Upon activating it, a plastic inflatable pilot complete with a pilot’s jacket and 
hat springs up from the empty copilot’s seat (the copilot having taken ill, as well) 
and smoothly assumes control of the plane, plastic inflatable hands on the yoke. 
Everyone is relieved until, moments later, the automatic pilot springs a leak and the 
plane begins to plummet towards the ground as he deflates. Panic ensues until the 
flight attendant is able to reinflate him successfully. 
After the terrifying technical malfunction, however, everyone in the cockpit ap-
pears to feel overly confident in the automatic pilot’s ability to keep the plane safely 
in the air, at least until the plane has to land. People come and go from the cockpit as 
they attempt to address other crises on the plane and engage in various comedic 
hijinks. Indeed, the blind trust of the characters in the patently absurd inflatable pilot 
is one of the funniest aspects of the cockpit scenes. We, as the audience, would 
presumably never trust a flimsy plastic “pilot” to fly an airplane without supervision 
(if at all), and so the characters’ willingness to do so is both hilarious and horrifying.  
Recent experience, however, teaches us that the automatic pilot scenes in 
Airplane! may, in fact, be strangely astute, at least with regard to human responses 
to automation. Over the last two years, many automobile manufacturers have begun 
introducing significant new forms of automation into their vehicles. Tesla, for exam-
ple, has introduced “Autopilot” to its Model S, a premium feature that can keep the 
vehicle centered within a lane, maintain a constant speed, and brake when appropri-
ate, thus eliminating the need for drivers to steer, accelerate, or brake while the 
Autopilot is functioning properly.2 The reliability of the feature, however, is limited. 
Tesla designed the “Autosteer” subsystem within Autopilot, for instance, only to 
work “on highways that have a center divider and clear lane markings.”3 Accord-
ingly, Tesla has gone to great lengths to warn drivers that they must continuously 
monitor their vehicles while using the Autopilot feature due to its significant 
limitations.4 Even a fairly short stretch of road with faded lane markings can cause 
an Autopilot-driven vehicle to veer into another lane, and so users of the feature must 
be extremely vigilant or risk a serious accident. 
Many Tesla drivers, however, appear to view the risks of the Autopilot system 
very differently. Since the advent of Autopilot, the internet has been inundated with 
                                                                                                             
 
 2. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., ODI RESUME: INVESTIGATION PE 16-007, 
at 4 (2016), https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.PDF [https:// 
perma.cc/G8TW-PR92]. 
 3. Id. at 8. 
 4. Id. at 6. 
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videos of Tesla drivers paying little to no attention to their Autopilot-driven vehicles, 
even when those vehicles are driving at high speeds on major highways. Instead, the 
videos show Tesla drivers sleeping, playing games, dancing, and, much like the char-
acters in Airplane!, moving out of the driver’s seat and into other sections of the car 
and engaging in various comedic hijinks. All of this occurs, moreover, in spite of the 
fact that, unlike the characters in Airplane!, the Tesla drivers have received clear 
warnings about the limitations of the Autopilot system.  
To be fair, Tesla’s Autopilot system is far superior to and overwhelmingly less 
absurd than the plastic inflatable pilot in Airplane!. But Autopilot’s appearance of 
safety may, in fact, make using it all the more dangerous. Unlike the plastic pilot in 
Airplane!, which looks amateurish and unreliable and thus should have inspired cau-
tion in the movie’s characters, Tesla’s Autopilot system is built into both the hard-
ware and software of the car, has an impressive dashboard interface, and operates 
beautifully when used in optimal conditions. It provides an impressive illusion of 
being much more comprehensive and adroit than it actually is. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, Tesla drivers have treated Autopilot-operated Teslas as being fully 
driverless when, in fact, they are only partially so and remain dependent upon con-
stant human supervision to minimize their inherent risks. This disconnect—between 
perception and reality—has led to devastating consequences on occasion, as 
discussed at length below. 
Tesla’s Model S is not the only partially driverless (“semi-autonomous,” in indus-
try parlance) car currently on the market. As noted above, “[m]ost high-end cars from 
brands like Mercedes, BMW and Lexus are equipped with radar, cameras and other 
sensors that allow for . . . features like automatic cruise control, automatic parking, 
lane keeping and automatic braking,” and many more car manufacturers are expected 
to release similar features on their models in the very near future.5 The 2015 Infiniti 
Q50S, for instance, has “Active Land Control and lane departure features . . . and 
Direct Adaptive Steering”  that allow the driver to remove his or her hands from the 
steering wheel and feet from the pedals while the car is in motion.6 Similarly, the 
2015 Mercedes-Benz S65 AMG offers “Distrionic Plus with Steering and Active 
Lane-Keeping Assist,”7 and the 2016 BMW 750i xDrive offers “Active Driving 
Assistant Plus”8 that does essentially the same things. All of these models and 
systems raise the same concern: that drivers of these vehicles will overestimate the 
safety of their car’s semi-autonomous capabilities while simultaneously 
underestimating their need to monitor the vehicle.  
                                                                                                             
 
 5. Andrew Connor, Semi-Autonomous Cars Bring the Self-Driving Car Closer to Real-
ity, GEAR PATROL (Oct. 23, 2015), http://gearpatrol.com/2015/10/23/semi-autonomous-cars-
bring-self-driving-car-closer-reality [https://perma.cc/7AEN-2EN4]. 
 6. Don Sherman, 2015 Infiniti Q50S, CAR & DRIVER (Feb. 2016), http:// 
www.caranddriver.com/features/semi-autonomous-cars-compared-tesla-vs-bmw-mercedes-
and-infiniti-feature-2015-infiniti-q50s-page-2 [https://perma.cc/LH5Y-DQUX]. 
 7. Don Sherman, 2015 Mercedes-Benz S65 AMG, CAR & DRIVER (Feb. 2016), https:// 
www.caranddriver.com/features/semi-autonomous-cars-compared-tesla-vs-bmw-mercedes-
and-infiniti-feature-2015-mercedes-benz-s65-amg-page-3 [https://perma.cc/SYN4-JXWB]. 
 8. Don Sherman, 2016 BMW 750i xDrive, CAR & DRIVER (Feb. 2016), https:// 
www.caranddriver.com/features/semi-autonomous-cars-compared-tesla-vs-bmw-mercedes-
and-infiniti-feature-2016-bmw-750i-xdrive-page-4 [https://perma.cc/VSS3-7RMF]. 
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Despite these concerns, U.S. lawmakers have done virtually nothing to regulate 
or even investigate semi-autonomous cars. Instead, they have focused their efforts 
on the fully driverless cars that are not yet available to consumers, rather than the 
partially driverless cars that are already on U.S. roads. Indeed, the September 2016 
Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (“Policy”) released by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) explicitly states that it only applies to 
“highly” automated vehicles and does virtually nothing to ensure the safety of semi-
autonomous cars.9 This oversight has been a grave mistake. A growing body of re-
search shows that drivers have an extremely difficult time adequately monitoring 
semi-autonomous cars, and yet growing numbers of these vehicles are sold in this 
country each year. As a result, lawmakers should worry that the United States could 
experience an uptick in highway injuries and fatalities in the very near future unless 
federal and state governments step in to regulate both the design and use of these cars 
in a comprehensive yet sensible manner. Worse yet, such an uptick in traffic accidents 
could stymie the development and adoption of fully autonomous cars which, 
counterintuitively, will almost certainly be significantly safer than their semi-auton-
omous counterparts.  
In this paper, I explore the ways in which existing driverless car laws and policy 
initiatives have not adequately dealt with the risks posed by semi-autonomous cars. 
In particular, I focus on the limitations of the Policy, a document which will likely 
be extremely influential in the development of driverless car law at both the federal 
and state levels in coming years. I then advocate for a series of laws designed to fill 
the gap in driverless car regulation and minimize the inherent risks of semi-autono-
mous vehicles. I conclude by noting that, because semi-autonomous cars pose an 
entirely different set of safety concerns and considerations than fully autonomous 
ones, we should be careful to consider each type of car on its own merits rather than 
responding to all levels of automation with lowest common denominator policies and 
laws. 
In Part I of this paper, I describe the development of driverless car technology in 
the United States, the levels of automation that the NHTSA has established to de-
scribe the differences in those technologies, and the benefits that consumer adoption 
of driverless cars will likely provide to the United States. In Part II, I provide an 
overview of the state of the law—both federal and state—surrounding the develop-
ment and use of driverless cars. In Part III, I analyze the risks presented by semi-
autonomous cars, vehicles that require constant monitoring by human drivers while 
their automated features are engaged. Namely, I discuss the issues with both driver 
distraction and consumer misconceptions about the aptitudes and limits of these au-
tomated features. In Parts IV and V, I argue that a series of changes need to be made 
to federal and state law to address these issues. Each of these changes, I posit, is a 
necessary component of both enhancing highway safety in the United States and 
promoting the use and development of safer automobiles. I conclude by discussing 
additional research and analysis that need to occur in this area of the law. 
                                                                                                             
 
 9. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 
10 (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Driverless cars, or “autonomous vehicles” as they are known in both law and ac-
ademic literature, “are those in which at least some aspects of safety-critical control 
function (e.g., steering, throttle, or braking) occur without direct driver input.”10 
These vehicles use a combination of sensors—including radar systems, cameras, la-
sers, and global positioning system (GPS) units—to gather real-time information 
about the vehicle’s surroundings and to assess important variables such as vehicle 
position, speed, location, and the speed and location of other vehicles, objects, and 
people nearby.11  
A. Levels of Automation 
The degree to which a driverless car can function independently of a human driver 
depends upon its level of automation. In the 2016 Policy, NHTSA adopted the six-
level measurement of automation created by SAE International, a professional asso-
ciation of automotive engineers.12 SAE created these levels to provide “common ter-
minology for automated driving,” and to highlight the differences between semi-au-
tonomous and fully autonomous cars.13 NHTSA believes that adopting these levels 
and SAE’s definitions thereof will provide both “clarity and consistency” in discus-
sions about automated vehicles.14 Those levels are as follows: 
Level 0—No Automation: In Level 0 vehicles, a human driver “does everything.”15 
The driver must steer the vehicle, accelerate, brake, use appropriate signals, and mon-
itor both the vehicle and the road at all times.16 An older car without cruise control is 
an example of a Level 0 vehicle. 
Level 1—Driver Assistance: Level 1 vehicles contain “an automated system . . . 
[that] can sometimes assist the human driver conduct some parts of the driving 
task.”17 In a car with a basic cruise control feature, for instance, the driver can remove 
his or her foot from the accelerator but must still steer the vehicle and brake if 
necessary. Other Level 1 cars may have an automated system like electronic stability 
control that may operate in the “background” and assist the driver in avoiding 
accidents but otherwise not assist the driver with any parts of his or her moment-by-
moment driving tasks. In short, in Level 1 vehicles, “there is no combination of 
                                                                                                             
 
 10. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY 
CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3 (2013) http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/ 
rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/C54U-8JCN]. 
 11. Kyle L. Barringer, Comment, Code Bound and Down . . . A Long Way To Go and a 
Short Time To Get There: Autonomous Vehicle Legislation in Illinois, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 
123 (2013). 
 12. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 9. 
 13. SAE INT’L, AUTOMATED DRIVING: LEVELS OF DRIVING AUTOMATION ARE DEFINED IN NEW 
SAE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD J3016, at 1 (2014), https://cdn.oemoffhighway.com/files/ 
base/acbm/ooh/document/2016/03/automated_driving.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWX2-UF3N]. 
 14. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 9. 
 15. Id. 
 16. SAE INT’L, supra note 13, at 2. 
 17. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
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vehicle control systems working in unison that enables the driver to be disengaged 
from physically operating the vehicle by having his or her hands off the steering 
wheel and feet off the pedals at the same time.”18 
Level 2—Partial Automation: In Level 2 cars, “an automated system on the vehi-
cle can actually conduct some parts of the driving task, while the human continues 
to monitor the driving environment and performs the rest of the driving task.”19 
“Combined functionality” is the hallmark of Level 2 vehicles.20 The driver may en-
gage in a combination of automated features—cruise control and lane centering, for 
instance—that allow him or her to cede more than one driving function to the vehicle 
itself. A driver of a Level 2 vehicle, for instance, may be able to remove his or her 
hands from the steering wheel and foot off the pedals at the same time.21 However, 
because the vehicle is not fully automated, the driver “is still responsible for moni-
toring the roadway . . . and is expected to be available for control at all times and on 
short notice.”22 
Level 3—Conditional Automation: Level 3 vehicles have automated systems that 
“can both actually conduct some parts of the driving task and monitor the driving 
environment in some instances, but the human driver must be ready to take back 
control when the automated system requests.”23 The key difference between a Level 
2 and a Level 3 vehicle is the level of monitoring required by the human driver. In 
Level 3 vehicles, the driver need only be available for “occasional control”: when 
the vehicle signals to the driver that he or she must reassume control due to, for in-
stance, changes in the traffic or weather patterns near the vehicle.24 Otherwise, the 
vehicle itself is capable of operating safely without human supervision within certain 
parameters, and the driver could read or text as long as he or she remained available 
to resume control of the vehicle when signaled to do so.25 In Level 2 vehicles, 
however, a human must monitor the vehicle at all times, as the vehicle’s ability to 
detect what is happening in the environment around it is much more limited.26 
Level 4—High Automation: In Level 4 vehicles, “an automated system can con-
duct the driving task and monitor the driving environment, and the human need not 
take back control, but the automated system can operate only in certain environments 
and under certain conditions.”27 Unlike the drivers of Level 3 vehicles, the drivers of 
Level 4 vehicles are “not expected to be available for control at any time during the 
trip,” beyond engaging the vehicle and inputting a destination.28 However, Level 4 
                                                                                                             
 
 18. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 10, at 4.  
 19. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
 20. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 10, at 5. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
 24. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 10, at 5. 
 25. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REPORT NO. DOT HS 812 044, HUMAN 
FACTORS EVALUATION OF LEVEL 2 AND LEVEL 3 AUTOMATED DRIVING CONCEPTS: CONCEPTS 
OF OPERATION 26 (2014).  
 26. See id. 
 27. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 9. 
 28. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 10, at 5. 
2018] HANDS ON THE WHEEL  719 
 
vehicles can only be operated safely “in certain environments and under certain con-
ditions,” like the absence of severe weather.29 The difference between Level 3 and 
Level 4 vehicles is essentially one of degree: Level 4 vehicles can drive themselves 
completely independently in a greater number of conditions and circumstances. 
Level 5—Full Automation: In Level 5 automobiles, “the automated system can 
perform all driving tasks, under all conditions that a human driver could perform 
them.”30 A human driver need never supervise or control the vehicle and may, in fact, 
not have the option to do the latter. Some manufacturer designs for Level 5 vehicles, 
for instance, lack steering wheels and pedals.  
In this article, I will be focusing on Level 2 autonomous vehicles: those that are 
partially driverless, or “semi-autonomous” (I will be using those terms interchange-
ably). These vehicles, as noted above, can conduct some aspects of driving for the 
driver, but require constant human supervision for safe operation. As discussed at 
length below, this need for human supervision makes these vehicles very different 
than highly automated vehicles (HAVs), those that are Level 3 or higher and require 
only limited supervision or no supervision at all.  
B. The Development of Driverless Cars 
As of mid-2018, Level 0, 1, and 2 vehicles are available for consumer purchase 
and are legal to drive in every state. While it is difficult to find precise numbers, it 
appears that the overwhelming majority of cars currently on U.S. roads fall into the 
first two categories, containing either extremely little or no automation capabilities. 
Level 2 cars are currently available, but seem to make up a low percentage of the 
over 250 million vehicles in the United States,31 with their number likely hovering 
somewhere between 90,000 and 200,000.32 That percentage, however, is expected to 
change quickly.  
A significant number of major vehicle manufacturers have either already released 
or plan to release a Level 2 automation system into at least some of their models 
within the next twelve months. Models offered by Mercedes, Infiniti, BMW, Audi, 
and Lexus are already “equipped with radar, cameras and other sensors that allow for 
safety and convenience features like automatic cruise control, automatic parking, 
lane keeping and automatic braking.”33 Additionally, in late 2017, Cadillac debuted 
its “Super Cruise” system, which works much like Tesla’s Autopilot, on its 2018 
                                                                                                             
 
 29. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 9, at 9. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Number of Vehicles Registered in the United States from 1990 to 2016 (in 1,000s), 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-
since-1990 [https://perma.cc/6GDS-Y2YT].  
 32. An August 2016 article, for instance, notes that there were over 90,000 Autopilot-
enabled Teslas in the United States at that time. Since that time, Tesla has released its Autopilot 
2.0 and other car manufacturers have released their partially autonomous systems, so that num-
ber has likely increased substantially. Jack Stewart, Tesla’s Cars Have Driven Over 140M 
Miles on Autopilot. Here’s How, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/08/how-tesla-autopilot-works [https://perma.cc/CE3M-35ST]. 
 33. Connor, supra note 5.  
720 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:713 
 
Cadillac CT6 model.34 Honda has also said that it expects to release semi-autono-
mous technologies into its models fairly soon.35 
Experts expect that more advanced HAVs will be available for purchase within 
less than five years. Tesla, for instance, has asserted that its Model S is likely to be 
fully driverless (either Level 4 or 5) by the end of 2018. More conservative industry 
experts expect other fully autonomous Level 4 or 5 vehicles to be available for con-
sumer purchase by 2019.36 Ford and Google, for instance, are both actively designing 
and testing models that lack a steering wheel, accelerator, and brake pedals.37 While 
there is a fairly steady trickle of news articles and commentary asserting that fully 
driverless cars are much further off than industry insiders have predicted,38 if 
anything, “[s]elf-driving technology has developed far faster than experts envisioned 
when Google started developing it in 2009.”39 Thus, industry insiders predict that 
approximately seventy-five percent of vehicles on U.S. roads will be fully autono-
mous by 2035.40 
Where automakers differ is in their approach to the development of autonomous 
vehicles.41 Manufacturers and technology companies are taking one of two ap-
proaches. First, most traditional automobile manufacturers are taking a “gradualist” 
                                                                                                             
 
 34. John R. Quain, Hands-Free Caddy: 2018 Cadillac CT6 Launches Super Cruise Semi-
Autonomous Feature, CAR & DRIVER (Sept. 26, 2017, 3:59 PM), 
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/hands-free-caddy-2018-cadillac-ct6-launches-super-
cruise-semi-autonomous-feature [https://perma.cc/7DJ7-KCKH]. 
 35. Sam Byford, Honda Reveals Its Plans for Autonomous Vehicles, VERGE (June 8, 
2017, 8:02 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/8/15761272/honda-self-driving-cars-
autonomous-level-4-date [https://perma.cc/Z57R-3FEC]. 
 36. Trefis Team, General Motors Inching Closer to Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Mar. 16, 
2016, 8:38 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/03/16/general-motors-
inching-closer-to-self-driving-cars [https://perma.cc/E9JH-8XRV]. 
 37. For information on Ford’s self-driving car, see Mike Murphy, Ford (F) Will Have a 
Self-Driving Car with No Steering Wheels or Pedals in 2021, QUARTZ (Aug. 16, 2016), 
https://qz.com/759643/ford-self-driving-car-2012-no-steering-wheels-or-pedals-or-handover-
function [https://perma.cc/DS55-XDPH]. For information on Google’s, see Samuel Gibbs, 
Google’s Self-Driving Car: How Does It Work and When Can We Drive One?, GUARDIAN 
(May 29, 2014, 12:11 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/28/google-
self-driving-car-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/QX8G-YM8X]. 
 38. See Scott Collie, DMV Report Shows Self-Driving Cars Are Learning—Fast, NEW ATLAS 
(Feb. 2, 2017), http://newatlas.com/google-waymo-dmv-disengagements-report/47716 
[https://perma.cc/VKS4-NGEG]; Connor, supra note 5; Lauren Johnson, Automakers Are 
Improving Self-Driving Cars with Troves of Data, ADWEEK (Feb. 28, 2017),  
http://www.adweek.com/digital/automakers-are-improving-self-driving-cars-with-troves-of-data 
[https://perma.cc/BYF3-87QQ]. 
 39. Paul Ingrassia, Alexandria Sage & David Shepardson, How Google Is Shaping the 
Rules of the Driverless Road, REUTERS: INVESTIGATES (Apr. 26, 2016, 12:30 PM), http:// 
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/autos-driverless [https://perma.cc/6J2D-QM9W]. 
 40. Richard C. Balough, Are Your Clients Ready for the Impact of Driverless Cars?, BUS. 
L. TODAY, May 2016, at 1, 2; Noah Buhayar & Peter Robison, Can the Insurance Industry 
Survive Driverless Cars?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 30, 2015, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/can-the-insurance-industry-survive-
driverless-cars- [https://perma.cc/7X3U-X8SC]. 
 41. Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast & Furious: The Misregulation of Driverless Cars, 73 
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approach to automated technologies, increasing the level of automation in their cars 
over time. Over the next two or three years, for instance, they will sell Level 2 vehi-
cles while continuing to pursue the goal of producing Level 4 or 5 vehicles five years 
from now.42 This slower approach to development gives consumers time to grow 
“comfortable with the technology” and companies time to develop more advanced 
autonomous systems for later release.43 
Second, tech companies, like Google, and a very small number of traditional au-
tomobile manufacturers are taking an “all-in” approach to driverless cars, developing 
and testing fully driverless Level 4 or 5 vehicles immediately and not releasing them 
to consumers until they are certain the vehicles can drive safely with no human in-
tervention or supervision.44 Companies taking this more aggressive approach are do-
ing so out of concern for consumer safety; they wish to avoid Level 2 and even Level 
3 vehicles because these vehicles present “one of the biggest challenges with this 
technology: [h]ow to safely transfer control from the computer to the driver, partic-
ularly in an emergency.”45 Ford, for instance, has said that it does not believe that a 
“quick handoff” from vehicle to driver is feasible.46 Google has gone even further, 
asserting that any human involvement would make their driverless cars “less safe.”47 
The dominant approach, thus far, has been a gradualist approach.48 As discussed 
above, a large number of automobile manufacturers have either already released 
Level 2 versions of their vehicles or are planning to do so within a matter of months. 
As one journalist has observed, this is a “faster and cheaper” approach to entering 
into the market for driverless cars.49 It is also, he notes, a way to enhance their bottom 
line: “[f]eatures such as collision-avoidance radar, self-steering and self-parking 
boost profit per vehicle” and allow companies to capture this revenue immediately 
rather than waiting until their Level 4 or 5 vehicles have been fully developed.50 
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C. Benefits of Driverless Cars 
The development of driverless cars is likely to yield tremendous benefits for so-
ciety as they “are now poised to be the next great transformative transportation tech-
nology . . . [and] are predicted to have a significant impact on how we live, work, 
and use our time.”51 Among a number of significant benefits, they are likely to reduce 
traffic, increase productivity, enhance fuel efficiency, and provide greater transpor-
tation accessibility to groups like the elderly and the disabled whose members may 
be unable to qualify for a driver’s license.52 Most importantly, fully driverless cars 
will likely reduce traffic accident injuries and fatalities by a significant percentage.53  
Automobile accidents in the United States injure and kill shocking numbers of 
people. Each day, an average of 100 people are killed on U.S. roads and 6000 more 
are injured.54 While traffic accidents have generally been on the decline for the past 
decade, a recent NHTSA study showed a troubling reversal of that trend: 
A statistical projection of traffic fatalities for 2016 shows that an esti-
mated 37,500 people died in motor vehicle crashes. This represents an 
increase of about 6.9 percent as compared to the 35,092 fatalities re-
ported to have occurred in 2015 . . . . If these projections are realized, 
fatalities will be at the highest level since 2007 when 41,259 fatalities 
were reported . . . The fourth quarter of 2016 represents the ninth con-
secutive quarter with year-to-year increases in fatalities as well as the 
fatality rate.55 
Even before this uptick, motor vehicle crashes were the leading cause of death for 
several different age groups in this country,56 and the economic cost of motor vehicle 
crashes exceeded $240 billion each year.57 
Human drivers are overwhelmingly the cause of these accidents.58 Studies con-
sistently show that approximately ninety-four percent of all traffic accidents are 
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caused by human driver error rather than vehicle malfunction or nature-related phe-
nomena (weather, animals on the road, etc.).59 Drunk driving accounts for a 
startlingly large portion of these accidents, causing approximately thirty-one percent 
of all traffic-related fatalities.60 Additionally, distracted driving—driving while 
talking on the phone, texting, or using other electronic devices—is a growing 
problem on U.S. roads. One study revealed that seven in ten American drivers said 
“that as a result of being distracted while driving, they have slammed their brakes or 
swerved to avoid an accident, missed a traffic signal, or actually caused an acci-
dent.”61 Another study revealed that “[m]ore than half of all eighteen-to-twenty-four-
year-olds admit to texting while driving, and more than eighty percent drive while 
on the phone.”62 There are also other common driver issues that contribute to the 
likelihood of traffic accidents: driving while drowsy, making errors of judgment, fail-
ing to react to evolving driving situations quickly enough, and speeding. 
By taking humans out of the driver’s seat, fully autonomous vehicles (Levels 4 or 
5) can eliminate all of these problems. Not only are they incapable of driving drunk, 
their powers of perception are significantly better than those of humans: 
“Autonomous vehicles, powered by sensors, software, cartography, and computers, 
can build a real-time model of the dynamic world around them and react appropri-
ately. Unlike human drivers, they do not get distracted or tired, have almost instan-
taneous perception-reaction times, and know exactly how hard to brake or when to 
swerve.”63 
Thus, experts have predicted that “if 10 percent of vehicles in use were autono-
mous vehicles, 1,100 fewer people would die in car accidents. ‘With 90 [percent] 
penetration, the U.S. would save 21,700 lives and have 4.2 million fewer crashes per 
year.’”64 These safety gains alone should be enough to convince U.S. policymakers 
to strongly support and promote the development of these vehicles. 
II. CURRENT LAWS & POLICIES 
Both state and federal lawmakers have begun to prepare in earnest for the coming 
influx of autonomous cars on U.S. roads. These vehicles will not only revolutionize 
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driving, they will also require significant changes to existing motor vehicle laws and 
policies, if not an overhaul those laws altogether: 
While there is already a robust body of laws pertaining to automotive and 
highway safety, there also seems to be consensus that those laws must be 
amended because they are all based on the underlying assumption that 
human beings are operating the vehicle. Furthermore, given that autono-
mous technology innovations are ‘severely outpacing legislation de-
signed to allows for [their] use,’ lawmakers appear to be feeling some 
urgency to make those amendments or at least pass some semblance of a 
framework of laws pertaining to driverless cars.65 
Tech companies and automobile manufacturers appear to feel the same sense of 
urgency and are actively calling for federal and state lawmakers to develop a com-
prehensive legal scheme for fully autonomous vehicles as quickly as possible.66 
Indeed, because fully autonomous vehicles must be programmed by manufacturers 
to obey traffic and motor vehicle laws, (a) manufacturers must know what those laws 
are in advance of releasing their vehicles to the general public, and (b) those laws 
must be applicable to both human-driven and autonomous cars. For instance, laws 
like the one currently in force in New York that require drivers to keep one hand on 
the steering wheel at all times would presumably make it illegal for humans to ride 
in a Level 5 vehicle that lacks a steering wheel altogether.67  
A. State Driverless Car Laws 
State lawmakers have taken the lead on making these changes and additions to 
motor vehicle laws.68 As of May 2018, twenty states have enacted or adopted laws 
pertaining to driverless cars,69 another six have driverless car legislation pending,70 
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and two states have contemplated—but failed—to pass such laws.71 Although each 
state statute is somewhat unique, similar types of provisions exist within them. For 
example, at least three states have passed driverless car laws that define the person 
who engages a driverless car (i.e., turns on its engine) as the “operator” of that vehi-
cle.72 Similarly, four states and the District of Columbia have passed laws that would 
require human drivers to “override,” or retake control, of their autonomous vehicles 
under certain circumstances.73  
In my earlier work, I have detailed both the content of existing state laws and the 
ways in which those laws manage to be both overbroad and unduly narrow.74 Namely, 
existing state driverless car laws ignore the differences between semi-autonomous 
and fully autonomous vehicles, impose unwarranted liability on human drivers in 
many circumstances, and incentivize human driver behavior that may be less safe 
than letting the autonomous vehicles drive themselves.75 I have also posited that the 
legal issues created by these driverless car laws could chill the development and pro-
duction of these vehicles.76 
Tech companies and automobile manufacturers have expressed similar concerns 
and cast a proverbial wary eye on the lead that states have taken over the federal 
government in their driverless car-related lawmaking efforts. Indeed, “[a]s growing 
numbers of states pass ‘a patchwork of rules’ pertaining to driverless cars, industry 
officials have grown concerned about inconsistencies between those rules and about 
their ability to manufacture autonomous vehicles that will comply with the laws of 
all fifty states.”77 Companies ranging from Google to General Motors have urged 
Congress to make the federal government the locus of control of regulation of 
autonomous vehicles.78 In 2016, the Obama administration responded to these calls 
by both (a) proposing to spend $3.9 billion over the next ten years to promote the 
development of driverless cars and supporting infrastructure and (b) ordering the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to draft a comprehensive driverless car 
policy within six months.79 The DOT’s response arrived in the form of the Federal 
Automated Vehicle Policy, released in September of that year.80 
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B. The Federal Automated Vehicle Policy 
On September 20, 2016, NHTSA issued the “Federal Automated Vehicles Policy” 
(“Policy”).81 Its stated goals were to “set[] out an ambitious approach to accelerate 
the [heavily automated vehicle (HAV)] revolution” by issuing “agency guidance 
rather than . . . rulemaking in order to speed the delivery of an initial regulatory 
framework and best practices to guide manufacturers and other entities in the safe 
design, development, testing, and deployment of HAVs.”82 In short, NHTSA sought 
to create a framework that would encourage consistency in driverless car laws across 
state lines while providing maximum flexibility for car manufacturers and tech com-
panies to continue their development and testing of autonomous cars.83  
Issuing policies like this one is clearly within NHTSA’s scope of responsibility 
rather than that of any other federal agency: 
 Fifty years ago, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act [“Safety Act”] . . . giving NHTSA broad jurisdiction 
over all elements of design in motor vehicles and motor vehicle equip-
ment. It also directed the Agency to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards (FMVSS) [“Standards”] to reduce motor vehicle crashes and 
related deaths and injuries.84  
It is NHTSA’s difficult task, therefore, to assess whether and how automated ve-
hicles ought to be regulated under the Safety Act and Standards, a challenging task 
given that automated vehicles pose very distinct—and fairly new—sets of safety 
risks and benefits. As NHTSA notes in the Policy: 
 The innovative technologies that are the basis of HAVs are vastly dif-
ferent from the technologies that existed when Congress enacted the 
Safety Act. Then, vehicles were largely mechanical and controlled by the 
human driver via mechanical inputs and linkages. At that time, sensing 
of a vehicle’s performance and the roadway environment, and making 
driving decisions about that performance were done solely by the human 
driver.85 
Now, however, humans have less and less control over their vehicles as those ve-
hicles become more automated, and NHTSA must confront these dramatic changes 
with virtually no guidance from existing law and policy. Indeed, existing motor ve-
hicle laws provide virtually no guidance to NHTSA, as they are all based on the 
fundamental assumption that human drivers, rather than anything else, are in control 
of the vehicles on U.S. roads. 
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NHTSA has begun what will almost certainly be a long and involved law and 
policy-making process by acting somewhat tentatively, repeatedly making clear that 
the Policy is “not mandatory,” and requesting cooperation and voluntary infor-
mation-sharing on the part of manufacturers.86 NHTSA also notes in the Policy that 
it does not, as of yet, see any need to shift the current division of responsibility be-
tween the federal government and the states with regard to regulating automobiles: 
“[Department of Transportation (DOT)] and the Federal Government are responsible 
for regulating motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, and States are responsi-
ble for regulating the human driver and most other aspects of motor vehicle opera-
tion.”87  
Despite NHTSA’s seeming hesitancy to begin imposing mandatory requirements 
on autonomous vehicle manufacturers and the somewhat preliminary nature of the 
Policy, the Policy has a number of notable features. 
1. Focus on Level 3 Vehicles and Above 
First, despite the fact that fairly significant amounts of automation are present in 
vehicles that qualify as Level 2 or higher, the DOT has “draw[n] a distinction be-
tween Levels 0-2 and [Levels] 3-5 [vehicles] based on whether the human operator 
or the automated system is primarily responsible for monitoring the driving environ-
ment.”88 More notably, NHTSA notes that the Policy is only intended to apply to 
vehicles that are Level 3 or higher.89 The Policy is much more reticent with regard to 
providing guidance for Level 2 vehicles. NHTSA expresses concern about the safety 
of these lower level vehicles and makes several recommendations to manufacturers 
that are currently producing them, but otherwise does little to address the unique risks 
and benefits of semi-autonomous vehicles.90 
NHTSA’s failure to provide more comprehensive guidance with regard to Level 
2 vehicles has been a common criticism in the public comments that followed the 
release of Policy. Delphi, a prominent tech company, expressed concern “that the 
Policy provides inconsistent messaging regarding NHTSA’s view of SAE Level 2 
vehicles and the level of compliance expected.”91 Ford Motor Company stated that 
it “believes that further clarifications and revisions to the Guidance areas for testing 
for [Level 2 vehicles] need to be considered.”92 The advocacy group Consumer 
Watchdog was troubled that the Policy “notes the importance of training HAV driv-
ers, but sets no required standards” for educating drivers of Levels 2 vehicles “where 
consumers have sometimes been led to believe that the vehicle is more capable of 
driving itself than is actually the case.”93 Similarly, Consumer Reports noted that it 
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was concerned about “human-machine interface (HMI) factors on safety,” particu-
larly in Level 2 and 3 vehicles and that the Policy did not adequately address this 
issue.94 Nevertheless, as of early 2018, NHTSA has not yet released a set policy or 
guidance with regard to Level 2 vehicles. 
2. Lack of a Premarket Approval Process 
Second, nothing in the Policy requires tech companies or more traditional auto-
mobile manufacturers to obtain premarket approval from NHTSA before introducing 
new forms of automation into their vehicles.95 Instead, as long as those vehicles com-
ply with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), they may be sold to 
consumers without consulting with NHTSA in advance, even though the FMVSS 
were developed prior to the availability of semi-autonomous cars.96 NHTSA explains 
that creating a premarket approval process for autonomous cars is not within its cur-
rent authority and thus would require a statutory change rather than a unilateral 
decision on the part of the agency to regulate these vehicles.97 
This lack of a premarket approval process for autonomous cars is highly problem-
atic. One journalist explains: 
 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration says it lacks the 
authority to pre-empt automakers’ new autonomous features until some-
thing goes wrong.  
 “If someone wants to sell a totally automated vehicle today, you could 
probably get a court to decide there’s nothing N.H.T.S.A can do about 
that until it presents an unreasonable risk to safety,” said an agency 
spokesman, Gordon Trowbridge. 
 Proving such an unreasonable risk to safety under the agency’s man-
date, he said, means citing crashes or malfunctions that have already hap-
pened. For now, that leaves a legal vacuum . . . .98 
Until the needed statutory changes are made, NHTSA’s only means of ensuring 
that a vehicle’s automation systems are safe prior to consumer sales are to rely on 
voluntary premarket reporting on the part of tech companies and manufacturers. In 
the Policy, therefore, NHTSA requests that “manufacturers and other entities volun-
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tarily provide [Safety Assessment] reports regarding how the [Policy] has been fol-
lowed,” although it notes that it may make this reporting mandatory “through a future 
rule making.”99 NHTSA explains that “[mandatory reporting] would require entities 
to submit a Safety Assessment to NHTSA’s Office of the Chief Counsel for each 
HAV system, outlining how they are meeting this Guidance at the time they intend 
their product to be ready for use . . . on public roads.”100  
For now, however, manufacturers are free to decide whether or not to follow the 
Policy and submit a Safety Assessment prior to selling their automated vehicles, and 
there do not appear to be any consequences for choosing not to do so.101 The only 
potential consequences would arise, as discussed, “[if] an autonomous vehicle or 
other emerging automotive technology causes crashes or injuries, or has a manifested 
safety-related failure or defect.”102 If that occurs, NHTSA could intervene through 
its preexisting investigative and enforcement authority.103 
3. Model State Policy 
Third, given that one of the main purposes of the Policy was to stave off “a patch-
work of inconsistent laws and regulations among the 50 States and other U.S. juris-
diction[s],” the Policy sets forth a Model State Policy.104 NHTSA makes clear, how-
ever, both that (a) it does not intend for states to codify this model policy or, in fact, 
any other portion of the broader Policy,105 and (b) it does not want States to regulate 
“the performance of HAV technology and vehicles,” which currently falls under the 
U.S. Department of Transportation’s jurisdiction.106 Moreover, seemingly in re-
sponse to complaints on the parts of tech companies and automobile manufacturers, 
NHTSA has requested that states “evaluate their current laws and regulations to ad-
dress unnecessary impediments to the safe testing, deployment, and operation of 
HAVs, and update references to a human driver as appropriate.”107 
Some states, however, have responded to the Model State Policy in precisely the 
way that NHTSA has instructed them not to—by initiating legislation to codify the 
Model State Policy into state law: 
For example, the California Department of Motor Vehicles . . . published 
revised draft regulations for autonomous vehicles following NHTSA’s 
release of the Policy. The draft regulations would mandate permits to test 
and later deploy HAVs on public roads in California, and to obtain a 
permit, a manufacturer would have to certify compliance with the 
Vehicle Performance Guidance and submit a copy of NHTSA’s Safety 
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Assessment. If these draft regulations become law, a manufacturer would 
effectively be required to submit the Safety Assessment, because failing 
to do so would proscribe the manufacturer from testing or deploying 
HAVs on public roads in California.108 
A number of public comments to the Policy assert that this kind of state action is 
understandable given the ambiguities of the Policy.109 Tesla points out in its public 
comments, for example: 
 Rather than discouraging states from creating new laws and regula-
tion concerning HAVs, Tesla believes the Policy could reasonably be 
read as encouraging states to create them. Indeed, the Policy language is 
equivocal about its directive to states: “[t]he following sections describe 
a model regulatory framework for States that wish to regulate procedures 
and conditions for testing, deployment, and operation of HAVs.” A 
model regulatory framework that is smart and light in its guiding princi-
ples can be a beneficial step toward a consistent national framework. 
However, by drafting a model regulatory framework, the Agency also 
invites the very patchwork regulation that it seeks to avoid.110 
Accordingly, other public commenters have requested that NHTSA revise the Model 
State Policy section to “remove language which could be interpreted to invite states 
directly to regulate HAV systems and vehicles.”111 It remains to be seen whether 
NHTSA will respond to those calls or whether it will not and states continue to adopt 
the Model State Policy as state law. 
4. Regulatory Gap 
All told, while the release of the 2016 Policy marks the beginnings of a federal 
regulatory framework for autonomous vehicles, the Policy also creates a very large 
regulatory gap. In opting to regulate Level 3 and higher autonomous vehicles via the 
Policy and not to regulate Level 2s, NHTSA is tacitly choosing to regulate the fully 
autonomous that are still at least a year away from market release rather than the 
semi-autonomous cars that are already available to consumers and on U.S. roads. 
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This is a critical mistake. As discussed at length below, a significant amount of evi-
dence suggests that Level 2 vehicles are likely far more dangerous than Level 3, 4, 
or 5 vehicles, and thus in greater need of regulation at both the federal and state 
levels.112 
Additionally, because Level 2 vehicles are fundamentally different than Level 3 
or higher vehicles (a difference recognized by NHTSA itself in the Policy), they are 
in need of a different kind of regulation, a need that has thus far gone unmet by both 
states and the federal government.113 Because Level 2 vehicles are still human-driven 
cars, issues like driver distraction and consumer perceptions of the capabilities of the 
vehicle’s automation systems are far more critical in those vehicles than in Level 3 
vehicles.  Those issues are not relevant at all in Level 4 and 5 vehicles.114 Thus, Level 
2 vehicles, though semi-autonomous, should be regulated differently than fully 
autonomous vehicles so as not to blur these important distinctions.115 
III. THE DANGERS OF SEMI-AUTONOMOUS CARS 
An exploration of the dangers unique to Level 2 vehicles highlights why the reg-
ulatory gap discussed immediately above ought to be addressed and corrected as 
quickly as possible.  
A. Distraction Issues 
First, despite the fact that Level 2 vehicles require continuous monitoring on the 
part of human drivers to ensure safe operation,116 a growing body of research shows 
that drivers have a difficult time maintaining focus on the vehicle and the road while 
using the autonomous features of these vehicles.117 In one study, human drivers were 
asked to sit behind the wheel of a Level 2 vehicle for between forty-five minutes and 
one hour and monitor the vehicle constantly while it drove down a test track with 
both adaptive cruise control (ACC) and lane centering (LAADS) features engaged, 
meaning that the test drivers did not have to steer, accelerate, or brake.118 The human 
drivers merely had to sit in the driver’s seat and watch the road.119 Despite the sim-
plicity of the task, their performance was poor:  
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 Overall, drivers were estimated to be looking away from the forward 
roadway approximately 33% of the time . . . . Comparisons between ACC 
and LAADS head pose data reveal a significant increase in time spent 
looking away from the forward roadway under semi-autonomous relative 
to [Level 1, cruise control]-only driving . . . [D]rivers tended to increase 
the percentage of time spent looking off-road by an average of 33 percent 
while driving under LAADS, suggesting that drivers were paying some-
what less attention to the forward roadway under the autonomous driving 
mode. This general finding is consistent with the secondary task data 
presented earlier suggesting that drivers engaged in more secondary ac-
tivities under LAADS driving. Although this pattern was generally reli-
able, there were substantial individual differences in the magnitude of 
the effect across individuals with some drivers showing no increase un-
der LAADS driving relative to ACC driving. Approximately one-third 
of the drivers (4 out of 12) showed substantial increases in the percentage 
of time spent looking off-road of at least 73% when operating under 
LAADS.120 
There were also “significant increases in . . . eating, reaching for an item in the rear 
compartment, dialing and talking on the cell phone, and texting/e-mailing,” and a 
“widespread” increase in “very risky tasks” like reading books and watching movies 
while the autonomous features of these vehicles were engaged.121 
A more recent study of drivers of Level 2 cars showed that drivers “exhibited 
significant increases in eccentric head turns [meaning simply that they turned away 
from the road] and secondary tasks during automated driving, even in the presence 
of a researcher,” and that over a quarter of the drivers engaged in some form of read-
ing while their vehicle was driving in semi-autonomous mode.122 That study con-
cluded that while “[t]he effects of automation on a driver’s attention level remains 
an open question . . . early research suggests that a driver cannot immediately take 
over control of [a semi-autonomous] vehicle safely. Most drivers will require some 
type of warning time.”123 
 Anecdotal evidence has also shown that drivers of Level 2 cars are prone to letting 
their attention wander. A quick tour of YouTube clips of Tesla drivers using the 
Autopilot features of their cars shows those drivers, among other things, sleeping,124 
playing board games,125 arm wrestling,126 and, in at least one case, engaging in a 
plastic light saber battle.127 Google encountered similar behavior on the part of the 
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test drivers of their early driverless cars who, though instructed to “watch the road at 
all times and be ready to retake control if needed,” did things like climb into the 
backseat while the car was traveling down the highway.128 
In at least one case, failure to properly monitor a Level 2 vehicle led to a fatality. 
On May 7, 2016, a Tesla Model S collided with a tractor trailer that had made a left 
turn in front of it at an intersection of a highway in Florida, killing the Tesla’s 
driver.129 According to NHTSA’s post-accident report, 
Data obtained from the Model S indicated that: 1) the Tesla was being 
operated in Autopilot mode at the time of the collision; 2) the Automatic 
Emergency Braking (AEB) system did not provide any warning or auto-
mated braking for the collision event; and 3) the driver took no braking, 
steering or other actions to avoid the collision.130 
NHTSA’s post-accident examination “did not identify any defects in the design or 
performance of the AEB or Autopilot systems of the subject vehicles nor any inci-
dents in which these systems did not perform as designed.”131 Indeed, NHTSA noted, 
the automatic emergency braking system was “not designed to reliably perform in all 
crash modes, including crossing path collisions,” and the Autopilot system required 
“the continual and full attention of the driver to monitor the traffic environment and 
be prepared to take action to avoid crashes.”132 The driver, however, failed to pay 
such attention: crash reconstruction data “indicate[d] that the tractor trailer should 
have been visible to the Tesla driver for at least seven seconds prior to impact,” long 
enough for him to have applied the brakes and avoided the crash altogether.133 In-
stead, there were reports in the immediate aftermath of the accident that the driver 
had likely been watching a Harry Potter movie on a DVD player that was found at 
the scene of the accident.134 Thus, NHTSA concluded, the crash appears to have been 
the result of “a period of extended distraction”135 on the part of the driver rather than 
a “safety-related defect” inherent in the vehicle itself.136 
Lest we too quickly accuse drivers of Level 2 vehicles of acting recklessly or 
irresponsibly, it is important to note that trying to maintain constant focus on the road 
while sitting behind the wheel of a car that is essentially driving itself is an objec-
tively difficult task. Drivers have nothing to do other than watch the road, and so it 
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should come as no surprise that they may be inclined to daydream, become distracted, 
or even drift off to sleep.137 NHTSA has deemed this an “underload” problem: 
Automation removes some demand from the driver and places it upon 
the automated system. However, by removing some level of task demand 
from the driver, there may be an associated risk of drivers achieving a 
state of underload. This is a situation in which the driver is under-
stimulated, which may lead to fatigue, boredom, reduced levels of 
operator alertness, and sensation-seeking behaviors. This is potentially 
of more concern in Level 2 vehicles where there is an expectation that 
the driver will monitor the performance of the automation.138  
Unfortunately, even brief lapses of attention can be dangerous in a Level 2 vehicle, 
particularly one that is driving on a highway. One NHSTA report quoted a study by 
General Motors showing that a majority of driver distractions in Level 2 vehicles 
“occur for 3 seconds or less,” but noted that NHTSA’s “analysis of field incidents 
found that most [automobile crashes] developed in less than 3-4 seconds.”139 
Level 2 cars, therefore, are something of a paradox. On the one hand, “[s]emi-
autonomous features have proven to improve vehicle safety so long as drivers con-
tinue to pay attention when vehicles or other objects suddenly enter their path.”140 
On the other, the weight of available evidence suggests that drivers have a very dif-
ficult time doing exactly that: paying attention.141 Accordingly, as Toyota noted in its 
public comments to the Policy, “there is much ongoing research to be done to under-
stand human behavior and interaction with automated driving systems, but also to 
mitigate complacency and misuse or abuse.”142 
B. Driver Misconception Issues 
Second, a new body of evidence suggests that both the salespeople and drivers of 
Level 2 vehicles do not have a strong or thorough understanding of how the semi-
autonomous systems in their vehicles work or what their limitations are. This appears 
to be the result of several interrelated issues. 
1. Written Manuals and Onscreen Warnings 
To start, the primary source of information about the autonomous features of 
Level 2 cars appear to be owner’s manuals and warnings that appear on the digital 
displays within the cars themselves. However, there is no guarantee that drivers will 
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either (a) read these sources of information carefully, and/or (b) understand the in-
formation contained within them even if they do.143 A quick scan of some of these 
car manuals suggest that even careful readers may have to parse the language therein 
carefully to understand how the autonomous features on their vehicles work. The 
2016 BMW 7-series owner’s manual, for example, provides this warning about its 
automatic cruise control system: “If a vehicle driving ahead of you suddenly swerves 
into your lane, the system may not be able to automatically restore the selected dis-
tance. This also applies to major speed differences to vehicles driving ahead of you, 
e.g., when rapidly approaching a truck.”144  
There is no explanation as to what a “selected instance” is or what “restoring” it 
means. The second sentence is arguably even more confusing. Is the manual saying 
that the cruise control system will have a difficult time maintaining the selected speed 
if the vehicle is rapidly approaching another vehicle from behind, or that it may not 
be able to maintain proper distance from that vehicle? 
 The 2016 Volvo XC90 Owner’s Manual is similarly abstruse: “If ACC changes 
targets from a moving vehicle to a stationary one at speeds above 20 mph (30 km/h), 
the system will not react to the stationary vehicle and will accelerate to the previous 
set speed. The driver must actively apply the brakes to slow/stop the vehicle.”145 
The content of both of these warning is of critical importance. They point out a 
very significant limitation of automatic cruise control systems: while these systems 
can keep a vehicle at a safe distance behind moving cars that are in front of them, 
they cannot keep at a safe distance behind stationary cars that are in front of them 
and thus will not automatically brake if the vehicle is approaching, say, a car that is 
stopped at a stoplight. If a driver relies on automatic cruise control to stop their 
vehicle in such a situation, they will almost certainly collide with the stationary car 
in front them. However, the language used in Volvo’s manual does not adequately 
convey this information because it is abstract, technical, and difficult to understand. 
The leading clause—“[i]f ACC changes targets from a moving vehicle to a stationary 
one at speeds above 20 mph”—manages to be remarkably technical and to bury the 
lede.146 The relevant safety issue is not the changing of the “target,” it is that the 
vehicle can no longer be trusted to maintain a safe distance from the car in front of it 
if the driver does apply the brakes him or herself. It is, at best, highly unclear whether 
a Volvo driver skimming their owner’s manual will understand the nature of this 
safety issue. 
Additional questions need to be asked about whether owner’s manuals and on-
screen warnings are written for average or low reading comprehension ability, 
whether they can be easily understood by drivers for whom English is a second lan-
guage, and/or whether they are likely to be read by drivers at all. Thus far, no attempts 
appear to have been made to answer any of these questions despite their implications 
for the safety of Level 2 vehicles. 
                                                                                                             
 
 143. See Karsten & West, supra note 114.  
 144. BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE, THE BMW 7-SERIES: OWNER’S MANUAL 174 (2015). 
 145. VOLVO CAR CORP., XC 90: OWNER’S MANUAL 268 (2015) (emphasis in original). 
 146. Id. 
736 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:713 
 
 2. Poorly Informed Salespeople 
Next, a recent study by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) showed that most salespeople of Level 2 vehicles “were themselves unfamiliar 
with how new safety features worked.”147 Wired reports: 
 Last spring, undercover researchers from MIT’s Agelab interviewed 
salespeople at 18 Boston-area dealerships. They were out to see how 
much these retailers knew about the increasingly common automated 
driver assistance programs they were selling, like crash avoidance, lane 
keeping, adaptive cruise control, and blind spot monitoring.  
 The results: Not nearly enough. Just six of the 17 salespeople gave 
“thorough” explanations of the technologies in the vehicles they were 
selling; four gave “poor” ones. According to the researchers, at least two 
provided almost dangerously incorrect info. One explained Ford’s pe-
destrian detection technology is active at all speeds—even though it 
doesn’t turn on until you’re going at least 30 mph . . . . Another said 
drivers did not have to brake while using Chevrolet’s parking assist tech. 
They do.148 
Given that car dealerships play a “crucial role” in delivering information about 
how automated technologies work, this study should be of significant concern.149 
Another researcher of Level 2 vehicles encountered a similar problem in Washington, 
D.C.: car salespeople who “would mis-explain, wouldn’t know what I was looking 
for, wouldn’t know how to navigate the driver through the menus to see what the 
settings were.”150 
Furthermore, consumers who do not fully understand the automated systems in 
their Level 2 cars may opt to turn off important warning systems that deliver addi-
tional critical safety information about the vehicle, leading to even greater ignorance 
about the machines that they are piloting. Yet another recent study showed that of 
“265 Hondas brought in for servicing at dealerships in and around Washington, DC, 
less than a third still had their lane departure warnings turned on,” leading journalists 
to conclude that if drivers “don’t know why their car is making that gotdang dinging 
noise—they won’t use ‘em.”151 
3. Naming Issues 
Lastly, the names of some of these automated systems may be misleading. For 
example, some jurisdiction and consumer groups have raised significant concerns 
about Tesla’s use of the word “Autopilot” to describe its Level 2 system.152 Others 
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have raised similar concerns about Mercedes-Benz’s use of the name “Drive Pilot,” 
complaining that names like these “give the false and dangerous impression that 
these cars are more capable than they really are.”153 They also argue that these kinds 
of names can create driver confusion by suggesting that the vehicle can drive itself 
even though the manual or in-vehicle warnings indicate that the driver may need to 
retake control at a moment’s notice.154 
Indeed, to the extent that the word “autopilot” leads drivers of Level 2 vehicles to 
associate the autonomous systems in their cars with the autopilot systems on air-
planes and large ships, they would be making an improper and problematic compar-
ison. One scholar aptly describes the “critical differences” between these types of 
systems: 
[A]utopilots on ships and airplanes are limited to devices designed to 
maintain a singular course or direction by passively reacting to variations 
in limited, discrete outside conditions (like wind or current). 
Autonomous vehicles, on the other hand, will be required to interact with 
complex, evolving environments (e.g., traffic, unexpected events), and 
to make affirmative choices so as to safely arrive at the destination (e.g., 
what lane to be in, what exit to take). Thus, because autonomous vehicle 
technology may be most valuable given some reduced level of oversight, 
and because the technology involves substantially different expectations 
regarding expectations and capabilities, an analogy to ship and airplane 
autopilots is unenlightening.155 
However, with highly technical manuals and poorly informed salespeople as their 
primary sources of information about their vehicles, Level 2 drivers may rely fairly 
heavily (either consciously or unconsciously) on such comparisons in attempting to 
understand their vehicles. 
4. Consequences 
When drivers do not understand how the semi-autonomous systems in their cars 
work, accidents can happen and injuries or fatalities can result. Notably, these acci-
dents can happen both when a driver engages and disengages the autonomous sys-
tems in his or her car. In the example provided above, a driver that engages automatic 
cruise control may have an accident if he or she does not understand that the system 
will not automatically brake to avoid a crash with a stationary vehicle. Another ex-
ample highlights a similar issue when the driver chooses to disengage an autonomous 
system: 
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Consider the act of disengaging [automatic cruise control] and lane cen-
tering. The operator must first provide a disengagement input (e.g., but-
ton press on dashboard) informing the vehicle subsystem that the opera-
tor is willing and prepared to take over responsibility for maintaining 
speed and/or heading [(i.e., steering)]. The vehicle subsystem may then 
acknowledge the input with a feedback mechanism(s) that provides con-
firmation to the operator. A time period then passes before the automated 
component disengages, and the operator becomes responsible for speed 
and heading. 
 There may be potential for operational issues if the operator is not 
aware of certain specific tasks for which he/she is accepting responsibil-
ity. Should the operator believe he/she has only accepted responsibility 
for speed maintenance, for example, a potential conflict arises regarding 
authority for vehicle heading. Essentially, the operator may incorrectly 
assume the vehicle is still maintaining heading when, in fact, neither sub-
system is actively steering the vehicle.156 
Thus, without an adequate understanding of their Level 2 vehicles, drivers cannot 
reliably operate their vehicles safely and may, in fact, generate significant amounts 
of risk for both themselves and other drivers on the road. 
 IV. RECOMMENDED FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
The issues discussed at length above create unnecessary risks on U.S. roads, and 
thus lawmakers should respond by regulating Level 2, semi-autonomous cars as their 
own unique type of vehicle, rather than by improperly categorizing them with fully 
autonomous vehicles or more traditional human-driven cars.157 Due to the bifurcated 
way that automobiles are regulated in this country, however, this response must hap-
pen at both the federal and state levels. The federal government, through the DOT 
and NHTSA, regulates vehicle design and equipment and sets safety standards for 
all new automobiles sold in the United States, whereas states regulate driver behavior 
and motor vehicle operation by setting traffic laws and controlling the issuance of 
driver’s licenses.158 While there is strong argument to be made that this jurisdictional 
division may need to change at some point in the future as motor vehicle operation 
falls increasingly under the domain of a motor vehicle’s equipment (NHTSA’s re-
sponsibility) rather than a human driver (a state’s responsibility), for purposes of this 
paper, the current jurisdictional divisions will be respected.159 
To start, three changes should be made with respect to federal regulation of Level 
2 cars: (1) the introduction of a premarket approval process, (2) the mandating of 
attention warning systems within these vehicles, and (3) the passage of truth-in-nam-
ing regulations. While industry often resents greater federal regulation of their goods, 
traditional automakers, tech companies, and legal scholars have lobbied for greater 
federal involvement in the regulations of autonomous vehicles.160 The president of 
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Volvo, for instance, has lobbied for “one set of rules to regulate the operation of and 
liability for autonomous vehicles, not a piecemeal approach by 50 states.”161 NHTSA 
has signaled its interest in regulating semi-autonomous cars, as well, reporting that 
“[d]river misuse in the context of semi-autonomous vehicles is an emerging issue 
and the agency intends to continue its evaluation and monitoring of this topic, in-
cluding best practices for handling driver misuse as well as driver education.”162 
Thus, there appears to a general interest in the federal government passing the types 
of regulations proposed below, although the particular regulations being proposed 
might be met with industry objection. 
A. Premarket Approval 
First, Congress should grant NHTSA the ability to create and administer a pre-
market approval system for Level 2, semi-autonomous vehicles. Currently, as dis-
cussed above, no such approval is required.163 Instead, automobile manufacturers are 
free to place any form of automation into their vehicles as long as those systems 
comply with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (which do not address the 
safety of autonomous or semi-autonomous driving systems at all and are thus largely 
irrelevant to the safety of semi-autonomous vehicles).164 NHTSA has also requested 
that entities “voluntarily provide the agency with a Safety Assessment Letter 
outlining how the [Policy] has been followed.”165 As noted, however, there appear to 
be no consequences for choosing not to submit such a letter.166 
While many industry players have insisted that this current arrangement is rea-
sonable, and that “[t]o the extent that NHTSA has specific concerns about the poten-
tial safety of level 1 and/or 2 driving automation features, it should use its existing 
defect authority to address such concerns,”167 NHTSA’s existing defect authority is 
insufficiently protective of human safety in the context of semi-autonomous vehicles 
for two reasons: (a) NHTSA’s existing defect authority is reactive rather than proac-
tive and (b) NHTSA’s existing defect authority does nothing to stop manufacturers 
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and developers from “beta-testing” new forms of vehicle autonomy on unwitting 
consumers.168 
With regard to the first issue, NHTSA’s existing defect authority is an insufficient 
source of regulation for Level 2 vehicles because it is reactive rather than proactive. 
One scholar explains: 
The Safety Act generally gives NHTSA the ability to order recalls of 
autonomous driving technologies because of defects present in the com-
ponents of those technologies or because of defects attributable to the 
improper installation of the technology by an alterer. [However, i]n order 
to establish a defect, NHTSA must show a significant number of perfor-
mance failures.169 
This means that NHTSA must wait until a Level 2 system reveals itself to be dan-
gerous, likely through a series of automobile accidents, before it can step in and take 
action.170 This is both inefficient and risky for drivers. While NHTSA should abso-
lutely retain its defect authority powers—as sometimes defects only reveal them-
selves over time and millions of miles driven—those powers needs to be supple-
mented with the ability to investigate and (where necessary) regulate Level 2 tech-
nologies before they come to market in order to prevent needless injuries or fatalities. 
Additionally, without a premarket approval system in place, the risk of injuries or 
death may be inexcusably high: manufacturers and developers can exploit the lack 
of premarket regulation and “beta-test” new semi-autonomous systems on consumers 
without any assurances in advance that those systems are safe.171 Indeed, arguably, 
manufacturers are more likely to beta-test semi-autonomous technologies than fully 
autonomous ones on actual consumers: since drivers are supposed to be monitoring 
the semi-autonomous systems in their Level 2 vehicles at all times, manufacturers 
can easily blame driver inattention or distraction if something goes wrong, thus min-
imizing their liability. This issue is of such concern that even Consumer Reports has 
spoken out about it: 
“Consumers should never be guinea pigs for vehicle safety ‘beta’ pro-
grams,” [Laura MacCleery, vice president of consumer policy and mo-
bilization for Consumer Reports] says. “At the same time, regulators ur-
gently need to step up their oversight of cars with these active safety fea-
tures. NHTSA should insist on expert, independent third-party testing 
and certification for these features, and issue mandatory safety standards 
to ensure that they operate safely.”172 
Only a premarket approval process can provide assurance that semi-autonomous 
systems have an acceptable risk profile before their entry onto U.S. roads. 
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B. Mandatory Attention Warning Systems 
Second, NHTSA should mandate the installation of attention warning systems on 
all semi-autonomous vehicles because, as discussed above, unlike Level 3, 4, and 5 
vehicles which require little or no human supervision, the safety of Level 2 vehicles 
“cannot be ensured . . . without an engaged and vigilant driver in the loop.”173 These 
systems should be able to both monitor the level of engagement of the driver and 
“take the vehicle to a safe fall back condition if the monitor determines the driver is 
not sufficiently engaged.”174 Currently, NHTSA strongly suggests that manufacturers 
install such warning systems into their Level 2 vehicles, but doing so is not required 
under any NHTSA policies or regulations.175  
As the safety studies discussed above reveal, attention warning systems are a crit-
ical component of the safety of semi-autonomous cars because verbal and written 
warnings are not enough.176 In each of the studies or test protocols cited, drivers were 
verbally instructed to monitor the road continuously and yet, in each of those studies, 
a significant percentage of the drivers had an extremely difficult time doing so.177 
The effectiveness of written warnings is even more questionable.178 While, ideally, 
all drivers would carefully pore over the owner’s manuals of their vehicles, “the re-
ality is that drivers do not always do so,” and so manufacturers should design their 
vehicles accordingly.179 
Furthermore, NHTSA should mandate that these attention warning systems be 
both intuitive and standardized.180 The warning chimes and/or lights that provide the 
alerts in one type of semi-autonomous car should be the same as the warning chimes 
and/or lights that provide the alerts in other semi-autonomous cars. Thus, for in-
stance, if an owner of one type of semi-autonomous car goes on vacation and rents 
another type, that driver should not have to learn a new series of alerts that would 
signal that he or she needs to pay closer attention to the road. This form of intuitive 
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design and standardization “would help ensure drivers quickly understand the situa-
tion, as well as provide continuity for drivers moving from vehicle to vehicle.”181 
BMW is already attempting to take this approach by making their semi-autonomous 
system as intuitive as possible: 
 During design and development of automated functions, BMW takes 
into consideration reactions of the driver so that extensive additional 
training of the driver is not required. BMW aims to make the driving 
experience as intuitive as possible. Vehicle functions should be generally 
controllable while also taking into account potential misuse.  
 In general, as any one vehicle can have multiple drivers, BMW be-
lieves that OEMs should not rely heavily on consumer training, but 
should consider the drivers’ reactions in development.182 
These systems should be intuitive and standardized not only with regard to what 
forms of alarms or consequences are triggered when a driver does not pay adequate 
attention to the road, but also with regard to how long a driver can be inattentive 
before they are triggered. Consumer Reports, for example, found that it took more 
than three minutes after a driver’s hands were removed from the steering wheel be-
fore a Tesla Model S sounded any warnings.183 Other systems may sound alarms 
much sooner than that.  
Additionally, there are already substantive differences in how these systems work. 
Tesla, for example, monitors driver attention through the steering wheel in their mod-
els: 
If the system does not detect the driver’s hands on the steering wheel 
(assessed using microtorque measurements) or other signs of driver en-
gagement for periods of time that vary depending on road class, vehicle 
speed, road curvature, and traffic conditions, an escalating series of 
warnings is presented. The warnings start with a visual alert indicating 
that hands on the steering wheel are required. If the driver does not re-
spond to the visual warning, an audible chime is sounded after 15 sec-
onds. A more pronounced chime is initiated if the driver does not respond 
after another 10 seconds. If the driver fails to respond to the third alert 
stage within five seconds, the system gradually slows the vehicle while 
maintaining position in the lane. Once the driver’s hands are detected on 
the steering wheel, the warnings are suspended and Autopilot operation 
resumes.184  
As part of a September 2016 over-the-air software update, Tesla also added an 
“Autopilot strikeout” feature that removes the ability of the driver to use the semi-
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autonomous Autopilot system entirely for the remainder of a drive if the driver re-
peatedly fails to respond to alerts.185 GM’s attention warning system works differ-
ently, using sensors behind its steering wheels “that continuously scan[] the driver’s 
eyes and face.”186 If the system detects that a driver is not watching the road, the 
driver’s seat will vibrate. If the vibrations aren’t sufficient to induce the driver to pay 
attention, alarm chimes and warnings lights will engage.187 If the second round of 
warnings doesn’t work, the system will slow the car down or bring it to a stop en-
tirely.188 These differences in warnings systems should be addressed by NHTSA in 
favor of a more standardized approach. 
Even though current manufactures like Tesla and GM are placing attention warn-
ings systems into semi-autonomous vehicles, we cannot be confident that manufac-
turers will continue to do so in the future, particularly as new manufacturers enter 
into the development and sale of semi-autonomous cars for the first time. In fact, 
there may be market incentives not to include these warnings systems which will 
almost certainly annoy drivers who over-trust the technology and thus want to be 
able to be distracted while their vehicles are driving in semi-autonomous mode. For 
instance, there might be a strong market for semi-autonomous vehicles that promise 
to let drivers go for longer without paying attention to the road or that promise to 
“trust” drivers more and sound alarms less. Without a NHTSA regulation requiring 
such systems, consumers can only hope that the “[s]ubstantive human factors chal-
lenges” of semi-autonomous vehicles are being met by manufacturers.189 
Determining which attention warnings systems are most effective at generating 
the desired driver response—a return of their attention to the road—will likely re-
quire additional research. This research should be designed to address a number of 
different factors:  
There may also be some benefit to future system design from research 
into methods or techniques to handle ignored cues or to determine why 
the cues were ignored (e.g., potential misuse). When a cue is present but 
no operator subsystem action is taken, it may be of value to investigate 
the best course of action for the vehicle subsystem (e.g., increase in cue 
volume or secondary alert [e.g., haptic] supplemental to original alert 
[e.g., auditory]). In addition, research could provide input into the timing, 
sequence, and presentation of such cues for optimal system function.190  
Only through answering these questions can we solve the fundamental riddle 
posed by Level 2 cars: “How to get owners to trust the technology so they’ll use it—
but not trust it so much that they’ll be lulled into a false sense of security and there-
fore slower to react when the car needs them.”191 
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C. Truth in Naming 
Third, NHTSA should forbid vehicle manufacturers from naming their semi-au-
tonomous systems in such a way that they give consumers a false impression of how 
robust the technology is or how independently it can operate without driver atten-
tion.192 Names such as “Autopilot” (Tesla’s system) and “Drive Pilot” (Mercedes’s 
system) “can give the false and dangerous impression that these cars are more capa-
ble than they really are,” and thus lure drivers into making choices that undermine 
the safety of these vehicles.193 Those kinds of names can also create confusion for 
conscientious drivers by generating conflicting messages: (a) that the vehicle can 
drive itself while operating in semi-autonomous mode (as indicated by the name of 
the semi-autonomous system) but (b) that drivers need to monitor the vehicle while 
operating in semi-autonomous mode (as indicated by the driver’s manual or on-
screen warnings).194 
One jurisdiction has already acted on these concerns. In October 2016, the 
California Department of Motor Vehicles released draft regulations that would ban 
the word “Autopilot” from Tesla’s advertising.195 The Washington Post reported: 
 “The terms ‘self-driving,’ ‘automated,’ ‘auto-pilot,’ and other state-
ments that lead a reasonable person to believe a vehicle is autonomous 
constitute advertising regulated by the truth-in-advertising provisions in 
the Vehicle Code,” the state said. A true autonomous vehicle that could 
use such terms, California says, is one that is “equipped with technology 
that has the capability of operating or driving the vehicle without the ac-
tive physical control or monitoring of a natural person.”196 
In other words, California believes that words like “autopilot” are only used ap-
propriately to describe vehicles with Level 3 automated systems or higher, not Level 
2 vehicles.197 NHTSA should follow California’s lead. 
V. RECOMMENDED STATE LAWS 
Given the bifurcated nature of oversight of motor vehicles, statutes and 
regulations also need to be passed at the state level in order to ensure the safety of 
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semi-autonomous vehicles.198 While the federal government is best situated to 
regulate the design and equipment of these vehicles, states are currently the only 
entities with jurisdiction over driver behavior, traffic laws, and licensing.199 To that 
end, several laws pertaining to the operation of semi-autonomous cars appear to be 
warranted. 
A. Tampering with or Disabling Driver Monitoring Systems 
First, states should make it illegal for drivers to tamper with or disable the atten-
tion warnings systems in their vehicles.200 Drivers might be inclined to do so either 
(a) so they can pay less attention to the road (intentionally) without consequences 
from the attention monitoring system or (b) because they find those warning systems 
frustrating or annoying.201 Indeed, “[d]ata is now showing that some advanced driver 
assist systems for safety are being turned off or ignored by drivers because their no-
tifications are . . . distracting for the driver.”202 Drivers who want to disable these 
systems could do so by removing their physical components from the vehicle or by 
“sending signals to jam the technology.”203 
To the extent that drivers do either of these things intentionally and “in a manner 
that the operator knows to be against the design and intent of the automated compo-
nent,” those drivers should be subject to criminal charges.204 At least one scholar has 
called for this sort of misuse to be deemed reckless driving because it impacts 
whether the vehicle can be operated safely and thus creates a risk to other vehicles 
and drivers on the road.205 Punishing the driver, therefore “would deter the person 
from future alterations to her autonomous vehicle, deter others contemplating alter-
ations to their vehicles, and punish the individual for causing harm to others or prop-
erty.”206 
B. Update and Maintenance Requirements 
Second, drivers of semi-autonomous vehicles should be required to install all 
over-the-air software and firmware updates within a reasonable amount of time of 
their availability.207 Such updates can provide, among other things, critical safety 
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patches, improvements to the autonomous features of the car, fixes for software or 
firmware problems that have come to light, and even new safety features.208 These 
updates come to semi-autonomous vehicles typically through a Wi-Fi signal or the 
car’s own network connections, rather than from a trip to a service center or dealer-
ship. Additionally, these updates can arrive fairly frequently. For example: 
 Since it released Autopilot in October 2015, Tesla has made continu-
ous updates to the system’s firmware that are made available to consum-
ers as [over-the-air] updates. These updates have included changes to 
improve TACC, AEB and Autosteer performance, as well as adding new 
driver assistance safety features, such as In-Path Stationary Object 
(IPSO) braking and Pedal Misapplication Mitigation (PMM). In 
September 2016, Tesla released its 8.0 firmware update which included 
revisions in the driver monitoring strategy, as well as several enhance-
ments to AEB, DBS, and TACC performance.209 
Choosing to install these updates is as simple as pushing a button and thus requires 
virtually no effort on the part of owners or drivers of semi-autonomous vehicles.210 
In Teslas, for example, when an update is available, drivers are “notified on the center 
display with an option to install immediately, or schedule the installation for a later 
time.”211 Both of these choices can be made on the center display itself, which func-
tions as a touchscreen computer.212 
Installing these updates is an important part of the maintenance of semi-autono-
mous vehicles because it ensures that the semi-autonomous systems are as up-to-date 
and safe as possible and that each individual semi-autonomous vehicle can benefit 
from “fleet learning.”213 A recent article from The New Yorker explains: 
The software that runs autonomous vehicles is constantly learning from 
real-world driving data, getting better at recognizing things around it (the 
road, other cars, nearby trees) and deciding how to respond (steering, 
braking). All the information is transmitted to a centralized brain and 
used to make the fleet smarter. This sharing, or “fleet learning,” is in-
credibly powerful. It’s kind of like how, when your finger touches a hot 
stove, your foot, knee, and elbow also learn that it’s not a good idea to 
touch a hot stove.214 
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The semi-autonomous vehicles of drivers that choose not to install over-the-air up-
dates do not benefit from this learning and may retain otherwise fixable system de-
fects or safety issues that would be corrected if the updates are installed.  
A law or regulation requiring regular updates of semi-autonomous systems would 
be consistent with most states’ existing motor vehicle codes. A large number of states 
have laws requiring the annual inspection of all vehicles registered within the state.215 
Similarly, many states have laws requiring driver maintenance of vehicles when, for 
instance, a police officer finds a condition on a vehicle that they deem to be unsafe 
or to pose a risk to other people.216 Requiring drivers of semi-autonomous cars to 
install over-the-air updates within a reasonable amount of time would not only be 
less burdensome than these types of laws but also fulfill the same purpose: ensuring 
that all vehicles on state roads are safe and lacking any obvious defects or safety 
hazards. 
C. Mandatory Consumer Training 
Third, states should consider passing laws that require drivers of semi-autono-
mous cars to obtain preapproved training on the capabilities and limitations of semi-
autonomous vehicles.217 As discussed at length above, drivers who do not fully un-
derstand how the semi-autonomous systems in their vehicles work may wind up in-
juring themselves or others by, for instance, failing to brake when necessary out of a 
belief that the vehicle will do so instead or failing to monitor the vehicle appropri-
ately because the driver has a false sense of what the vehicle is capable of handling.218 
Indeed, the need for driver education is arguably more important in Level 2 vehicles 
than it is in Level 3, 4, or 5 vehicles because drivers of Level 2 cars are at greater 
risk of believing that their vehicles are much more capable of driving on their own 
than they actually are.219  
While, currently, some information is provided to consumers via owner’s manu-
als, on-screen notifications, and car dealerships (with varying degrees of accu-
racy),220 “there is a clear need, especially for vehicles that may require the interven-
tion of a driver or which can have their operational capabilities updated significantly, 
for important features of the AV system operation to be delivered to consumers in 
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other ways.”221 This is particularly true given both that (a) not all drivers may read 
the owner’s manual of a vehicle before driving it, and (b) written instructions or in-
formation appearing in manuals or on-screen warnings may be difficult to compre-
hend for various reasons.222  
Better sources of consumer information might include video tutorials created by 
car manufacturers that could be viewed on mobile phones, tablets, computers, or even 
on the screens located within the semi-autonomous vehicles themselves.223 States 
could mandate that such videos be viewed by purchasers of new semi-autonomous 
cars at car dealerships before the dealership is permitted to hand over the keys to 
these vehicles. There could even be brief tests after the conclusion of those videos if 
research determines that such tests enhance driver comprehension.224 Similarly, car 
manufacturers could require drivers to “unlock” the semi-autonomous options 
(and/or updates) in their cars prior to use by entering a code that is provided only 
upon successful completion of a tutorial, video, or quiz on the car manufacturer’s 
website. 
While the exact content of such tutorials or consumer training would have to be 
targeted to each particular type of Level 2 vehicle, at a bare minimum, all such 
tutorials should provide consumers with information about (1) the limitations of 
Level 2 systems, and (2) the critical differences between Level 2 vehicles and vehi-
cles with a higher level of automation. With regard to the first, drivers should be 
notified that semi-autonomous systems are not foolproof and that driver intervention 
is required in a number of common driving scenarios. For example, as discussed 
above, autonomous cruise control (ACC) systems are capable of both slowing down 
and speeding back up to the selected speed in response to the movements and speeds 
of automobiles nearby. However, ACC systems will not brake in response to cars that 
have come to a full stop in front of the vehicle.225 In those scenarios, drivers must 
brake themselves in order to avoid a collision.226 Similarly, most Level 2 vehicles 
cannot operate reliably in semi-autonomous mode during bad weather, when there 
are faded lane markings, or in limited visibility conditions.227 Drivers must under-
stand these limitations to operate their vehicles safely. 
With regard to the second form of information that should be provided to consum-
ers—information about the differences between Level 2 vehicles and vehicles with 
higher levels of automation—it is also vitally important that consumers understand 
the differences between driving, say, a Level 2 vehicle and a Level 3 vehicle, or 
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(when eventually available) a Level 3 vehicle and a Level 4 vehicle. NHTSA ex-
plains: 
Manufacturers and other entities should assume that the technical dis-
tinction between the levels of automation (e.g., between Level 2 and 
Level 3) may not be clear to all users or to the general public. And, sys-
tems’ expectations of drivers and those drivers’ actual understanding of 
the critical importance of their “supervisory” role may be materially dif-
ferent.228 
Given the various rates at which tech companies and car manufacturers are due to 
release various levels of automation—Tesla claims it will have Level 4 vehicles on 
the market by 2018, Volvo will release small numbers of Level 3 cars by the end of 
2017, and Cadillac will release its Level 2 Super Cruise system around roughly the 
same time—there will be at least a several year (if not decade-long) period during 
which automobiles of differing levels of automation will be on U.S. roads simulta-
neously.229 Drivers attempting to understand the capabilities of their own cars by 
looking to the capabilities of other cars—their neighbors’, friends’, co-workers’, 
etc.—may not realize that they are comparing, in effect, a Level 2 apple to a Level 3 
orange. Consumer training, therefore, must not only educate drivers about the capa-
bilities and limitations of their own vehicles, but also stress that those capabilities 
and limitations are unique and that other automobiles may have different automated 
systems with greater or more limited amounts of automation.  
NHTSA consumer advocates and scholars appear to favor a consumer education 
training requirement for drivers.230 In their public comments to the Policy, for in-
stance, the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety note: 
This [training] is especially necessary for Level 3 (and lower) AVs in 
which the driver may need to take over control of the vehicle when the 
operational limits of the AV system have been reached. The suggestion 
in the NHTSA AV Policy that consumers who purchase AVs should re-
ceive training on the operational capabilities and limitations of the AV 
system they purchase, along with an on-the-road demonstration prior to 
taking possession of the AV would be beneficial. However, the agency 
should take the next step and offer specific solutions and develop proto-
type program materials to guide manufacturers in this effort.231 
Encouraging states to put mandatory training programs in place for drivers of 
Level 2 vehicles would be consistent with their jurisdiction over drivers and motor 
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vehicle operation and with their current practice. Indeed, states already impose dif-
ferent licensing and driving requirements for different types of vehicles. Texas, for 
instance, issues Class A, B, and C commercial driver’s licenses, depending on, 
among other factors, the gross vehicle weight of the vehicles a driver intends to 
drive.232 Texas also requires drivers in possession of a commercial driver’s license to 
obtain additional “endorsements” to do things such as transport hazardous materials, 
tow a double or triple trailer, or drive a tank.233 Likewise, California’s motor vehicle 
code states that “[a] person may not operate a commercial motor vehicle described 
in this chapter unless that person has in his or her possession a valid commercial 
driver's license for the appropriate class, and an endorsement issued by the depart-
ment to permit the operation of the vehicle.”234 New York requires operators of com-
mercial vehicles to obtain a special endorsement to operate vehicles carrying metal 
coils.235 It would be consistent with current state practice, therefore, for states to re-
quire license endorsements that were dependent upon completion of training and/or 
a test—or something similar—for drivers of semi-autonomous vehicles.236 
However, states would have to address several issues to develop a reasonable and 
effective training protocol. First, it would be extremely difficult to standardize 
consumer training for Level 2 vehicles given that Level 2 vehicles vary in their 
capabilities and the ways in which their semi-autonomous systems are designed. 
Consumer training would almost certainly either (a) have to be targeted to each 
particular model of Level 2 car, which would seemingly require states to have to 
review and approve each manufacturer’s unique training materials, or (more likely) 
(b) develop more general training materials aimed at educating drivers about each 
particular type of semi-autonomous system available (for instance, automatic cruise 
control, lane centering, etc.).  
 Second, if states require that all drivers of Level 2 vehicles complete training, 
Level 2 vehicles would seemingly be unable to be lent out to “standard drivers,” and 
rental car companies would be unable to rent these types of vehicles to customers. 
This could, in turn, slow the adoption of driverless cars in general. Since the ultimate 
goal of both states and the federal government should be to improve highway safety 
by promoting the use of fully driverless cars, this should be of fairly significant con-
cern.237 
Third, far from remaining static, most Level 2 vehicles are subject to over-the-air 
updates of their systems that both change and improve the semi-autonomous features 
of that vehicle. Teslas that were purchased after November 2016 with a “driverless 
package” are currently Level 2 vehicles but will likely evolve into Level 4 or 5 vehi-
cles over time.238 Requiring a specialized license for a fully driverless car makes little 
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sense, and so Tesla owners would be put in a bit of a quandary if states adopt con-
sumer training requirements: under state law, they might have to obtain a special 
endorsement to drive the car in 2017, but they will no longer need that endorsement 
mere months later when the car becomes fully driverless.239 
Nevertheless, despite these issues, the need for greater consumer training remains, 
as does support for states to mandate that drivers complete such training, prior to 
operating semi-autonomous cars.240 
VI. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to the changes to federal and state law advocated above, there are a 
number of other gaps and uncertainties in our understanding of the risks posed by 
semi-autonomous cars, as well as a number of risks inherent in the legislative pro-
cess, that merit careful thought and discussion. They are as follows. 
A. Pressing Research Needs 
NHTSA “has already begun research to evaluate the ability of drivers to stay en-
gaged while HAVs are performing part (or all) of the driving task,” but a great deal 
more research needs to occur on the safety of Level 2 vehicles, in particular, and of 
the ability of drivers to maintain focus while such vehicles operate in semi-autono-
mous modes.241 Indeed, the available data seems to be contradictory. On the one 
hand, a number of studies (discussed above) have shown that drivers in Level 2 ve-
hicles have a tendency to become distracted and even reckless in some scenarios.242 
On the other, a recent study of Teslas equipped with the Autopilot Technology 
Package suggested that the Level 2 technology onboard these vehicles may actually 
make them safer: 
[NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation] analyzed mileage and airbag 
deployment data supplied by Tesla for all MY 2014 through 2016 Model 
S and 2016 Model X vehicles equipped with the Autopilot Technology 
Package, either installed in the vehicle when sold or through an [over-
the-air] update, to calculate crash rates by miles travelled prior to and 
after Autopilot installation. . . . The data show that the Tesla vehicles’ 
crash rate dropped by almost 40 percent after Autosteer installation.243 
While this was only one study of one type of Level 2 vehicle, it raises an interest-
ing possibility that has not yet been explored in any depth by researchers: the possi-
bility that, even with drivers prone to distraction, Level 2 vehicles are still safer than 
Level 1 or Level 0 vehicles.244 This is a question that merits much more formal and 
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extensive study. As Consumer Reports notes, while Level 2 vehicles “have the po-
tential to improve safety . . . we can’t make that determination until there is a suffi-
cient body of evidence in the field comparing accident records of cars with the [Level 
2] systems, to those without.”245 
There is another, more nuanced and abstract issue pertaining to semi-autonomous 
cars that also warrants greater thought and research: the possibility that use of Level 
2 systems over time may diminish driving skills in general. Several researchers ex-
plain: 
There is a possibility of overreliance upon automation when drivers are 
able to use a L2 or L3 automated driving system for some period of time. 
That is, the potential exists for drivers to constantly seek to activate the 
automated driving component of the vehicle after becoming familiar with 
the automation and how it functions. Researchers have postulated that, 
over time, this overreliance can possibly lead to degradation in driver 
skill as the reinforcement from constant engagement in the driving task 
is now lacking. This issue is of concern in the aviation domain, where 
pilot skill has been observed to suffer in the presence of frequent and 
continuous use of automated functions.246 
Scholars have expressed concern about this “learned incompetence issue” since 
well before Level 2 vehicles were available to consumers, and there does not yet 
seem to be any available data that would confirm or assuage those fears.247  
There appear, however, to be three main possibilities in regards to this learned 
incompetence issue. First, learned incompetence may not, in fact, be a real phenom-
enon, and driving skills amongst the U.S. driver population may remain unchanged 
in the face of greater consumer adoption of autonomous and semi-autonomous vehi-
cles (the “no problem” scenario). Second, learned incompetence may be a real and 
demonstrable phenomenon with little actual relevance or risk associated with it given 
the fast pace at which newer and greater forms of automation are being introduced 
into U.S. vehicles by tech companies and manufacturers. In essence, the greater de-
gree of independence of the vehicles themselves may wind up compensating for the 
greater degree of dependence of human drivers on automated systems to drive their 
vehicles safely (the “irrelevant problem” scenario).  
Third, learned incompetence may be a real and demonstrable phenomenon with a 
significant degree of risk associated with it. In this scenario, there could, for instance, 
be a fairly lengthy gap in time between vehicles being fully autonomous (and thus 
capable of driving safely on their own) and semi-autonomous vehicles being driven 
in large numbers and increasingly eroding the driving abilities of U.S. drivers. This 
diminished human-driving capacity, in turn, could create a great deal of risk on the 
road when semi-autonomous vehicles reach the limits of their technologies, and yet, 
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human drivers have little ability to regain control of their cars and respond to imme-
diate driving situations appropriately, quickly, and effectively (the “actual problem” 
scenario). The “no problem” and “irrelevant problem” scenarios obviously deserve 
little concern on the part of policymakers and legislators. The “actual problem” sce-
nario, however, does. Only greater research will reveal which of these three scenarios 
is most likely and whether and how lawmakers need to respond. 
B. The Coming Issues with Level 3 Cars 
While Level 2 vehicles present a unique set of issues arising out of the need for 
human drivers to continuously supervise these vehicles while driving in semi-auton-
omous mode,248 Level 3 vehicles present a related yet ultimately distinct set of issues. 
As a brief reminder, Level 3 vehicles can drive themselves in some situations but 
require a human driver to be prepared to reassume control of the vehicle when sig-
naled to do so by the vehicle itself.249 Drivers of Level 3 vehicles need not monitor 
their automobiles at all times but must be available to intervene when necessary.250 
This requires a careful negotiation between giving drivers greater leeway to take ad-
vantage of the higher level of automation by engaging in non-driving related activi-
ties (by, for instance, subjecting them to less distracted driving liability) while ensur-
ing that those drivers can retake control of the car quickly and effectively when 
needed.251 This, in turn, will require careful assessment of two factors. 
First, NHTSA needs to conduct or commission research about how long it takes 
for the average human driver to retake control of a vehicle safely when signaled to 
do so. This is a critical piece of information that may implicate significant aspects of 
Level 3 vehicle design and the overall safety of these vehicles: 
Level 3 vehicles provide . . . warning time, but the precise amount of 
time needed is unknown. The NHTSA guidance does not specify an ap-
propriate warning time, although some guidance can be found in high-
way design standards. The American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) recommends highway designers al-
low 200 to 400 meters for a driver to perceive and react to an unusual 
situation at 100 km/hr. This corresponds to 7 to 14 seconds, much of 
which is beyond the range of today’s radar at 9 seconds. In an emergency, 
a driver may be unable to assess the situation and make an ethical deci-
sion within the available time frame. In these situations, the automated 
vehicle would maintain control of the vehicle, and by default be respon-
sible for ethical decision making.252 
Another set of tests showed that “it takes an average of 3 to 7 seconds, and as long 
as 10, for a driver to snap to attention and take control, even with flashing lights and 
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verbal warnings,” which is a bit more reassuring than the 7 to 14 second range pro-
vided immediately above, but also highlights the uncertainty surrounding this issue 
and the need for more research.253 
Second, NHTSA needs to determine what, if any, driver notification or warning 
methods are most effective at generating quick and effective responses from human 
drivers. The City of New York poses the question more simply in its public comments 
to the Policy: “How will a driver who is reading, napping, or surfing the web be 
alerted that they need to take control?”254 Vehicles must be able to accurately convey 
information to human drivers who may be “disengaged from the driving task” and 
paying little or no attention to vehicle performance or road conditions, while also not 
providing so much information that drivers begin to “tune out” those warning signals 
or turn them off altogether.255 Research may also show that no warning systems are 
effective at this task and thus that (a) manufacturers should incorporate driver moni-
toring systems into Level 3 cars, and (b) drivers of Level 3 cars should be subject to 
the same driver distraction laws as drivers of Level 2 cars.256 Again, only greater 
research can provide needed guidance on this issue. 
C. The Risks Inherent in Lawmaking 
While lawmakers may have an initial impulse to regulate both semi-autonomous 
and fully autonomous vehicles heavily and as soon as possible, this approach in-
volves a significant amount of risk. As I discuss at length in a prior article:  
There are “inherent danger[s] in trying to design legislation too soon for 
new technology.” Such legislation could stifle development and thus un-
dermine the benefits that the technology has to offer. Moreover, given 
that the United States is still within early stages of driverless car roll out, 
it is difficult to accurately assess what the biggest regulatory needs will 
be.257 
Level 2 vehicles are particularly complicated in this regard because, unlike Level 3, 
4, and 5 vehicles, they are both already on U.S. roads, increasing in number every 
day, and yet still largely under-researched and misunderstood. This creates a set of 
risks in attempting to regulate them. 
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On the one hand, under-regulating semi-autonomous cars may increase the risk of 
traffic accidents and fatalities.258 Distracted driving remains a significant problem in 
the United States, and the growing popularity of semi-autonomous cars may only 
make that problem worse. On the other hand, over-regulating semi-autonomous ve-
hicles may slow the adoption of all kinds of autonomous vehicles, even the Level 4 
and 5 vehicles that are likely to be significantly safer, by making people mistrust the 
technology or subjecting them to so many laws that using those vehicles seems like 
too much of a hassle or liability issue.259 This hesitation, in turn, could undermine 
the profound safety benefits highly automated vehicles have to offer. This has 
happened in the past with other forms of automation and should give us pause here.260 
Overregulation may also heighten the risk of states creating a “patchwork” of 
inconsistent regulations that would make it difficult for automobile manufacturers to 
generate vehicles that comply with regulations in all jurisdictions.261 
There is not a clear way to resolve the tension inherent in regulating new forms 
of technology. The best approach would appear to be to proceed with caution, to base 
legislative and regulatory efforts on actual data and research results, and to regulate 
one step at a time rather than attempting to design and impose an overarching (and 
thus potentially overbearing) regulatory regime in one fell swoop.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The United States is in the midst of a revolution in transportation. Semi-autono-
mous vehicles are already available to consumers, with more models arriving to mar-
ket nearly every month. Fully autonomous cars will be available within the decade. 
The federal government and states throughout the nation have responded by rushing 
to pass laws designed to regulate the fully autonomous cars that have not yet arrived 
while largely ignoring the semi-autonomous cars that are already on U.S. roads. This 
was made especially clear in the Federal Automated Vehicle Policy that NHTSA re-
leased in late 2016, which explicitly states that it is intended to provide guidance with 
regard to the regulation of highly automated vehicles (Levels 3, 4, and 5) rather than 
partially automated vehicles (Level 2). This is an extremely troubling oversight.  
Despite the fact that semi-autonomous vehicles rely on continuous human super-
vision to operate safely, a growing body of research demonstrates that the drivers of 
Level 2 vehicles are prone to distraction. In at least one instance, this has had deadly 
consequences.262 Furthermore, an even more troubling set of studies suggests that 
both drivers and sellers of Level 2 vehicles do not have a strong understanding of the 
limitations of the semi-autonomous features of their cars and are thus at risk of failing 
to intervene and retake control of the vehicle when necessary.263  
Both the federal government and states should pass laws and regulations designed 
to address these safety issues with semi-autonomous cars. Consistent with the current 
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jurisdictional division in the regulation of motor vehicles in the United States, the 
federal government should pass a series of laws designed to regulate the design of 
semi-autonomous cars, whereas states should pass laws aimed at regulating how 
drivers operate these vehicles.  
Congress should grant NHTSA the ability to create and administer a premarket 
approval system for semi-autonomous vehicles. This would give NHTSA the ability 
to regulate the safety of semi-autonomous cars before accidents and fatalities occur 
and also minimize the ability of car manufacturers to beta-test semi-autonomous sys-
tems that may not yet be safe on unwitting consumers. Additionally, the federal gov-
ernment should require car manufacturers to install attention warnings systems that 
would alert drivers when their attention has wandered from the road. Finally, the 
federal government should limit the ability of car manufacturers to name semi-au-
tonomous systems something that would suggest to consumers that these systems are 
more independent or fully developed than they actually are. 
States, in turn, should pass laws that regulate the behavior of drivers of semi-
autonomous cars. In particular, they should forbid such drivers from tampering with 
or disabling driver monitoring systems that would limit their ability to become dis-
tracted while the semi-autonomous systems in their vehicles were engaged. Further-
more, owners of semi-autonomous cars should be required to install routine over-
the-air software updates that make their vehicles safer and correct critical safety de-
fects. Lastly, states should require that drivers of these vehicles obtain proper training 
as to the capabilities and limitations of semi-autonomous vehicles and of critical dif-
ferences between, for instance, Level 2 and Level 3 driverless cars. 
While a significant amount of research needs to be conducted on a number of 
issues surrounding semi-autonomous cars, sensible safety laws and regulations can 
minimize the risk that issues with semi-autonomous cars now will detract from con-
sumer acceptance and adoption of significantly safer fully autonomous cars later. 
Given the immense number of benefits that those vehicles stand to offer to the United 
States, particularly by reducing traffic accidents and fatalities, ruining our great ex-
periment with automated driving by failing to regulate early stages of the technology 
appropriately would not only be tragic but a profoundly missed opportunity to protect 
human life both now and later.  
 
